

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOI/PA  
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DATE 07-28-2015

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Date: 12/1/72

Transmit the following in \_\_\_\_\_  
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL \_\_\_\_\_  
(Priority)

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (65-35851)  
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-118121) (C)  
SUBJECT: ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS  
IS-R

Re NY airtel 10/30/72.

5-Bureau (RM)  
(1-65-63234) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)  
{ 1-105-216642 } (GOLDFINCH)  
(1-105-87025) [REDACTED] (S)  
2-Anchorage (RM) [REDACTED]  
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2-Columbia (RM)  
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2-Los Angeles (RM)  
2-Miami (RM)  
2-Mobile (RM)  
2-Newark (RM)  
2-New Haven (RM)  
2-New Orleans (RM)  
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2-Philadelphia (RM)  
2-Portland (RM)  
2-Richmond (RM)  
2-San Antonio (RM)  
1-New York  
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Approved: *[Signature]*

Sent \_\_\_\_\_

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Per \_\_\_\_\_

Special Agent in Charge

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NY 105-118121

Reference is made to NY airtel to the Bureau and interested offices concerning the information analyzed and set forth by NY as well as information prepared at the direction of the Bureau in the LHM accompanying this airtel.

For the information of interested offices, the LHM should not be disseminated outside the Bureau and that any information brought to the attention of interested offices should be furnished to Bureau Headquarters.

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2-Seattle (RM)  
2-Tampa (RM)

2-Washington Field (RM)  
1-New York (65-17812) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)  
1-New York (105-115626) (GOLDFINCH)

[redacted] (S)

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ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-218638)

11/13/72

SAC, NEW YORK (65-25702) (P\*)

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(OO:NY)

ReNYlet to Director, 2/14/72, and Bureau routing  
slip dated 5/10/72.

In view of the very limited identifying information  
furnished by [redacted] re captioned Unsub, efforts to identify  
him have been unproductive.

New York Office is awaiting response from [redacted]  
[redacted] and requests that Bureau attempt to determine if  
any additional information has been developed, particularly by  
[redacted] which can assist in initiating active investigation  
of this matter..

The NYO has placed this case in a pending inactive  
status.

*olej A Lyalin*

3 - Bureau (RM)  
1 - 105-216642) (LYALIN)  
1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)  
1 - New York

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (65-35851) DATE: OCT 30 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-118121) (P)

SUBJECT: ACTVITIES OF SOVIET TRAWLERS  
IS-R

ReBulet to NY, 9/1/72, with enclosures.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM. Two copies of enclosed LHM are being furnished coastal offices and those offices possibly having an interest in this matter.

5 Bureau (Encls. 8) (RM)  
(1 - 65-63234) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)  
(1 - 105-216642) (GOLDFINCH)  
(1 - 105-87025) [REDACTED]

2 - Anchorage (Encls. 2) (AMRM) (S)  
2 - Baltimore (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Boston (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Charlotte (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Columbia (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Honolulu (Encls. 2) (AMRM)  
2 - Houston (Encls. 2) (AMRM)  
2 - Jacksonville (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Los Angeles (Encls. 2) (AMRM)  
2 - Miami (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Mobile (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Newark (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - New Haven (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - New Orleans (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Norfolk (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Philadelphia (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Portland (Encls. 2) (AMRM)  
2 - Richmond (Encls. 2) (RM)  
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2 - Seattle (Encls. 2) (AMRM)  
2 - Tampa (Encls. 2) (RM)  
2 - Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)

1 - New York (65-17812) (METHODS OF DETECTING SOVIET ILLEGAL AGENTS)  
1 - New York (105-115626) (GOLDFINCH)

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1 - New York [REDACTED] (S)

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ENCLOSURE

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ENCL FILED WITH CC  
DESIGNATED FOR  
1 - 65-216642-1 DEN

242

35-1-242

ORIGINAL FILED IN

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NY 105-118121

(S) Enclosed LHM is being classified "~~SECRET~~" because it contains information furnished by [redacted] a most sensitive and valuable source, disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

NY T-1 is [redacted] (S)

NY T-2 is GOLDFINCH.

For the information of offices receiving copies of this communication, the Bureau has advised that the [redacted]

[redacted] The Bureau has advised that [redacted]

[redacted] the US and, therefore, also US territories.

As is evident from the facts set forth in enclosed LHM, it would be incumbent upon all offices receiving copies of this communication to alert and maintain liaison with the US Coast Guard which has primary jurisdiction in determining [redacted]

[redacted] This jurisdiction comes under the US Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, a division of Enforcement and Surveillance.

The Special Agent of the NYO in contact with US Customs Agency and US Coast Guard in New York is SA [redacted]

Any information coming to the attention of these offices in connection with the activities of Soviet trawlers in this regard should be brought to the attention of the Bureau and the NYO as the Illegal activities, to the Bureau's knowledge, has been mainly directed by the New York Residency; however, in coordination of these facts a copy should be furnished to WFO.

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NY 105-118121

Any further information obtained from either of the two above-mentioned sources will be brought to the attention of interested offices.

The NYO continues to maintain liaison with US Coast Guard in this matter.

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

January 11, 1973

16487

RE: GOLDFINCH

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 28, 1972, your PF 884.

For your information [redacted]

Byelorussian Delegation to the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly which was held between October 10, 1971, and December 16, 1971.

1 - London } Sent by R/s (a-7) 1-12-73 he

Delivered to Washington Representative of [redacted] on 1-12-73

by [redacted]  
S/ 105-216642-104

1 - [redacted] CONTROL FILE)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

JPL:aeh (7)

NOTE: Goldfinch is the British code name for information furnished by Oleg Lyalin, KGB officer who defected in England in 1971. We had furnished to the British a list of Soviet officials in the U.S. in 9/71 for display to Lyalin. One of the names included was [redacted]. The British advised that they were unable to find his name on any of the check lists and asked for further information concerning him. [redacted] entered the U.S. in 9/71 to attend a session of the UN General Assembly.

This is classified "SECRET" since it refers to information concerning a KGB defector, the disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the national security.

SECRET

LET-232  
1/11/73  
JPL

55 JAN 24 1973 DEM/GCM

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10-269-1

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UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X (1-HUM)  
DATE 07-28-2015  
FBI INFORMATION ONLY  
C82W33B91

ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-218638)

FEB 7 1973

SAC, NEW YORK (65-25702)

UNSUB;  
Armenian Operated By 13th Department  
KGB in the US  
IS-R  
(OO:NY)

ReNYlet to Director, 2/14/72, and 11/13/72,  
and San Francisco, SPIA letter dated 12/11/72.

For the information of San Francisco,  
captioned case is based on information received  
from OLEG LYALIN (Soviet Defector) describing an  
Agent of the KGB 13th Department (now referred to  
as Department V). The information concerning the  
Unsub is as follows:

An American who is now an American citizen  
living in the US. He left Armenia many years ago but  
still has relatives in Russia. He writes to his  
relatives; not to officials, and uses an ancient  
Armenian language which is difficult to translate  
as it is not spoken today.

(S)

Page 4 of referenced San Francisco SPIA  
letter mention: [REDACTED]

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(S)

Division, [REDACTED] in San Francisco, who has had  
numerous and extensive contacts with various Soviet  
officials, exchange students, visiting Soviet groups,  
etc., for a number of years. [REDACTED] is described  
as being a naturalized US citizen of Armenian  
descent who has a number of relatives including a  
brother and his mother currently residing in Soviet  
Armenia.

(3) - Bureau (RM)  
(105-216642) (LYALIN)  
2 - San Francisco (RM)  
1 - New York (105-115626) (LYALIN)  
1 - New York  
ICIG:lap  
(7)

NOT RECORDED

192 FEB 12 1973

37 FEB 15 1973

NY 65-25702

The San Francisco Office is asked to consider the possibility that these individuals could be identical.

(S) There are some obvious similarities between the Unsub and [redacted] as regards country of origin, present citizenship and relatives residing in Russia.

The apparent open association with Soviet officials on the part of [redacted] as evidenced by his visiting the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., last November for the October Revolution festivities would necessarily diminish the probability [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) The NYO suggests the possibility that [redacted] may have been utilized at some previous time by the [redacted]

(S) [redacted]  
[redacted]

(S) If either of the above is true it would lend credence to our initial consideration that the Unsub and [redacted] are identical and that the direction of the unsub has been diverted to other channels of activity.

The NYO realizes that this is only a remote possibility, however, no logical suspects have been developed and no additional information except the sketchy initial description of the Unsub has been received from LYALIN.

San Francisco is requested to conduct appropriate inquiry of local [redacted] representatives to resolve this matter.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (105-216642)

DATE: FEB 14 1973

FROM : *YPM/N* SAC, NEW YORK (105-115626)

SUBJECT: *JPB*  
OLEG A. LYALIN  
IS-R

ReNYlet, 11/20/72.

Enclosed herewith are five copies of an LHM captioned "SOVIET STATE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE (GNTK)/GOLDFINCH" dated as above.

The enclosed LHM is classified "Secret" as inquiry made by [redacted] was so classified and the unauthorized disclosure of the information contained therein could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to the national security.

The enclosed LHM is prepared for dissemination to [redacted] only in response to their inquiry of 12/7/72.

Any additional information which comes to the attention of the NYO in this matter will be submitted for dissemination to [redacted]

3 - Bureau (Encls. 5) (RM)  
(1-Legat, London)  
1 - New York

JB:kap  
(4)

ENCLOSURE

REC-77

EX-101

105-216642-10

4 FEB 14 1973

ESPIONAGE  
DOC. CHARGE



9 FEB 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

Soviet State Scientific and  
Technical Committee (GNTK)/Goldfinch

Reference is made to your memorandum No. 0867  
dated December 7, 1972, and our communication dated  
November 20, 1972.

As stated in our communication of November 20,  
1972, there is no direct evidence of a GNTK role  
being played in the current negotiations leading to  
a general trade agreement between the Soviet Union and  
the United States. We stated the [redacted]

[redacted] have always utilized the Soviet Trading  
Agency in the United States, the Amtorg Trading  
Corporation in New York City, to provide cover  
positions for [redacted] KGB and GRU officers and agents  
of the Scientific and Technical Directorates of the  
[redacted] It is these individuals who are involved in  
negotiations with American business firms for the  
purchase of technology and equipment.

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We therefore have no examples to offer  
of KGB or GRU officers operating under GNTK  
cover at this time.

This document contains neither  
recommendations nor conclusions of  
the FBI. It is the property of  
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be  
distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY ARNOLD E. BRANDT  
E: 10/28/2015 BY: [Signature]

10-21642-110  
3  
INDEFINITE

ny list  
MAR 6 1973

b7D

SUBJECT:   
CHARACTER:   
BUFILE:   
NYFILE:   
WFOFILE:

DR. G. A. CYALIN

IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF   
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN THE HANDLING OF ANY   
INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THIS SOURCE AND NO ACTION TAKEN   
WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS   
SOURCE OF INFORMATION.

b7D

IN COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR DISSEMINATION   
OUTSIDE THE BUREAU  SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED   
AS "A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE   
PAST". IT SHOULD FURTHER STATE THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS   
RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM THIS SOURCE AND NO DATE SHOULD BE SET   
FORTH IN THE DISSEMINATION.

b7D

IN THE EVENT ATTACHED INFORMATION IS TO BE   
DISSEMINATED FURTHER, EXTREME CAUTION SHOULD BE UTILIZED   
IN REPORTS WHICH STATE WHICH INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED   
BY

b7D

CLASSIFICATION:

"TOP SECRET"

The Bureau advised on 2/15/73 of the receipt   
of the following information

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	<u>Bureau</u>	<u>New York</u>	<u>WFO</u>
2 -	GOLDFINCH	105-216642	
2 -	<span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 300px; height: 50px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		1 - 105-155626
2 -	<span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 300px; height: 50px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>		1 - 105-18797
			1 - 65-14635
			SUB L
			1 - 105-9811

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DEGRADED TO

**SECRET**

Per ADG | 50074-752  
Date 4/11/2014

105-216642-  
NOT RECORDED  
170 MAR 13 1973

1 MAR 15 1973

[redacted] b7D

It has recently been reported that the Russian initials G.N.T.K. refer to the Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology. The KGB places many of its KGB officers within this committee within the Soviet Union in covert positions. In this manner, these individuals travel abroad ostensibly as bona fide scientific Soviet representatives of this committee while in effect they are basically interested in gathering information of value to KGB. It is indicated that GRU may also do likewise.

It was further learned relative to the above, that outside the Soviet Union, KGB deploys various KGB officers under the guise of Scientific Counsellors representing the Soviet Union's State Committee on Science and Technology.

As an example of the application of the above, would be the case of [redacted] b6  
[redacted] b7C  
[redacted] b7D  
Scientific counselor within the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., while in effect, [redacted] Chief of "Line X" within the WDC KGB Residence, [redacted]